Abstract-In this work, we aim to make attribute-based encryption (ABE) more suitable for access control to data stored in the cloud. For this purpose, we concentrate on giving to the encryptor full control over the access rights, providing feasible key management even in case of multiple independent authorities, and enabling viable user revocation, which is essential in practice. Our main result is an extension of the decentralized CP-ABE scheme of Lewko and Waters [8] with identity-based user revocation. Our revocation system is made feasible by removing the computational burden of a revocation event from the cloud service provider, at the expense of some permanent, yet acceptable overhead of the encryption and decryption algorithms run by the users. Thus, the computation overhead is distributed over a potentially large number of users, instead of putting it on a single party (e.g., a proxy server), which would easily lead to a performance bottleneck. The formal security proof of our scheme is given in the generic bilinear group and random oracle models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent trends show a shift from using companies' own data centres to outsourcing data storage to cloud service providers. Besides cost savings, flexibility is the main driving force for outsourcing data storage, although in the other hand it raises the issue of security, which leads us to the necessity of encryption. Traditional cryptosystems were designed to confidentially encode data to a target recipient (e.g. from Alice to Bob) and this seems to restrict the range of opportunities and flexibility offered by the cloud environment. Imagine the following scenario: some companies are cooperating on a cryptography project and from each, employees are working together on some tasks. Suppose that Alice wants to share some data of a subtask with those who are working on it, and with the managers of the project from the different companies. We see that encrypting this data with traditional techniques, causes that recipients must be determined formerly, moreover either they have to share the same private key or several encrypted versions (with different keys) must be stored. These undermine the possible security, efficiency and the flexibility which the cloud should provide.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) proposed by Sahai and Waters [16] is intended for one-to-many encryption in which ciphertexts are encrypted for those who are able to fulfil certain requirements. The most suitable variant for fine-grained access control in the cloud is called ciphertext-policy (CP) ABE, in which ciphertexts are associated with access policies, determined by the encryptor and attributes describe the user, accordingly attributes are embedded in the users' secret keys. A ciphertext can be decrypted by someone if and only if, his attributes satisfy the access structure given in the ciphertext, thus data sharing is possible without prior knowledge of who will be the receiver preserving the flexibility of the cloud even after encryption.
Returning to the previous example, using CP-ABE Alice can encrypt with an access policy expressed by the following Boolean formula: "CRYPTOPROJECT" AND ("SUBTASK Y" OR "MANAGER"). Uploading the ciphertext to the cloud, it can be easily accessed by the employees of each company, but the data can be recovered only by those who own a set of attributes in their secret keys which satisfies the access policy (e.g. "CRYPTOPROJECT", "SUBTASK Y").
In spite of the promising properties, the adoption of CP-ABE requires further refinement. A crucial property of ABE systems is that they resist collusion attacks. In most cases (e.g. [2] , [19] ) it is achieved by binding together the attribute secret keys of a specific user with a random number so that only those attributes can be used for decryption which contains the same random value as the others. As a result private keys must be issued by one central authority (CA) that would need to be in a position to verify all the attributes or credentials it issued for each user in the system. However even our example shows that attributes or credentials issued across different trust domains are essential and these have to be verified inside the different organisations (e.g. "MANAGER" attribute ). To overcome this problem, we are going to make use of the results of Lewko and Waters [8] about decentralising CP-ABE.
The other relevant issue is user revocation. In everyday use, a tool for changing a user's rights is essential as unexpected events may occur and affect these. An occasion when someone has to be revoked can be dismissal or the revealing of malicious activity. Revocation is especially hard problem in ABE, since different users may hold the same functional secret keys related with the same attribute set (aside from randomization). We emphasise that user revocation is applied in exceptional cases like the above-mentioned, as all other cases can be handled simpler, with the proper use of attributes (e.g. an attribute can include its planned validity like "CRYPTOPROJECT2015").
Simultaneous solutions for these two problems could enhance flexible access control in cloud-based secure data storage. Such "optimized" CP-ABE could hide symmetric keys, which are used to efficiently encode large amounts of data, and reveal them only for authorized users, who can be identified INFOCOMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL, ISSUE 2, 2015 1 Attribute-Based Encryption Optimized for Cloud Computing
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The problem of building ABE systems with multiple authorities was first considered by Chase [5] with a solution that introduced the concept of using a global identifier (GID) for tying users' keys together. Her system relied on a central authority and was limited to expressing a strict AND policy over a pre-determined set of authorities. Decentralized ABE of Lewko and Waters [8] does not require any central authority and any party can become an authority while there is no requirement for any global coordination (different authorities need not even be aware of each other) other than the creation of an initial set of common reference parameters. With this it avoids placing absolute trust in a single designated entity, which must remain active and uncorrupted throughout the lifetime of the system. Several other multi-authority schemes (e.g. [14] , [18] ) were shaped to the needs of cloud computing, although these lack for efficient user revocation.
Attribute revocation with the help of expiring attributes was proposed by Bethencourt et al. [2] . For single authority schemes Sahai et al. [15] introduced methods for secure delegation of tasks to third parties and user revocation through piecewise key generation. Ruj et al. [14] , Wang et al. [18] and Yang et al. [20] show traditional attribute revocation (in multiauthority setting) causing serious computational overhead, because of the need for key re-generation and ciphertext reencryption. A different approach is identity-based revocation, two types of which were applied to the scheme of Waters [19] . Liang et al. [11] gives the right of controlling the revoked set to a "system manager" while Li et al. [10] , follow [7] , from the field of broadcast encryption systems and give the revocation right directly to the encryptor. This later was further developed by Li et al. [9] achieving full security with the help of dual system encryption. For this approach, but in key-policy ABE, Qian and Dong [13] showed fully secure solution.
To the best of our knowledge no multi-authority system is integrated with identity-based user revocation and our work is the first in this direction.
Contribution.: Based on [8] and [7] we propose a scheme that adds identity-based user revocation feature to distributed CP-ABE. With this extension, we achieve a scheme with multiple, independent attribute authorities, in which revocation of specific users (e.g. with ID i ) from the system with all of their attributes is possible without updates of attribute public and secret keys (neither periodically, nor after revocation event). We avoid re-encryption of all ciphertexts the access structures of which contain a subset of attributes of the revoked user. The revocation right can be given directly to the encryptor, just like the right to define the access structure which fits to the cloud computing scenario.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [6] . In this paper, we make substantial extensions to the contributions presented in [6] , including a new, detailed security analysis of our proposed scheme, with a rigorous proof in the generic bilinear group and random oracle models, as well as proposal for an application approach in the cloud storage scenario and detailed explanations and reflections on related works. Organization.: In Section II we introduce the later used theoretical background. In Section III the details of our scheme can be found together with efficiency and security analysis. Directions for further research are proposed in the last section.
II. BACKGROUND
We first briefly introduce bilinear maps, and provide the relevant background on access structures and secret sharing schemes. Then we give the algorithms of Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption with identity-based user revocation.
A. Bilinear maps
We present the most important facts related to groups with efficiently computable bilinear maps.
Let G 0 and G 1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G 0 and e be a bilinear map (pairing), e : G 0 × G 0 → G 1 , with the following properties:
2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1. We say that G 0 is a bilinear group if the group operation in G 0 and the bilinear map e : G 0 × G 0 → G 1 are both efficiently computable. Notice that the map e is symmetric since e(g a , g
B. Access Structures and Secret Sharing
The requirements of decryption in an ABE scheme can be expressed using access structures (for formal definition see [1] ), which determines all the authorised sets of attributes that allow decryption. Most ABE schemes (like ours) are restricted to monotone access structures, meaning that any superset of an authorized set is authorized as well. We note that (inefficiently) general access structures also can be realized using our techniques by having the not of each attribute as separate attribute.
To enforce the access structure, determined by the encryptor, we are going to make essential use of Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS). Here we adopt the definitions from those given in [1] .
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Organization.: In Section II we introduce the later used INFOCOMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL, ISSUE 2, 2015 3 chosen, then Av = λ is the vector of shares of the secret s according to Π. The share (Av) x = λ x belongs to attribute ρ(x). In [1] it is shown that every linear secret sharing-scheme according to the above definition also enjoys the linear reconstruction property, defined as follows. Suppose that Π is an LSSS for the access structure A. Let S ∈ A be any authorized set, and let I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , } be defined as I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, there exist constants {ω i ∈ Z p } i∈I such that, if {λ i } are valid shares of any secret s according to Π, then i∈I ω i λ i = s. Furthermore, it is also shown in [1] that these constants {ω i } can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix A and for unauthorized sets, no such {ω i } constants exist.
We use the convention that (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) is the "target" vector for any linear secret sharing scheme. For any satisfying set of rows I in A, we will have that the target vector is in the span of I, but for any unauthorized set, it is not.
Using standard techniques (see [8] -Appendix G) one can convert any monotonic boolean formula into an LSSS representation. An access tree of nodes will result in an LSSS matrix of rows.
C. Revocation Scheme for Multi-Authority CP-ABE
A multi-authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption system with identity-based user revocation is comprised of the following algorithms: Global Setup(λ) → GP The global setup algorithm takes in the security parameter λ and outputs global parameters GP for the system. Central Authority Setup(GP ) → (SK * , P K * ) The central authority (CA) runs this algorithm with GP as input to produce its own secret key and public key pair,
The central authority runs this algorithm upon a user request for identity secret key. It checks whether the request is valid and if yes (i.e. the user's global identifier, denoted by GID, is not part of the RL revocation list: GID / ∈ RL), generates K * GID using the global parameters and the secret key of the CA.
Each attribute authority runs the authority setup algorithm with GP as input to produce its own secret key and public key pair, SK, P K.
The attribute key generation algorithm takes in an identity GID, the global parameters, an attribute i belonging to some authority, and the secret key SK for this authority. It produces a key K i,GID for this attribute-identity pair. Encrypt(GP, M, (A, ρ), {P K}, P K * , RL) → CT The encryption algorithm takes in a message M, an access matrix (A, ρ), the set of public keys for relevant authorities, the public key of the central authority, the revoked user list and the global parameters. It outputs a ciphertext CT .
The decryption algorithm takes in the global parameters, the revoked user list, the ciphertext, identity key and a collection of keys corresponding to attribute, identity pairs all with the same fixed identity GID. It outputs either the message M when the collection of attributes i satisfies the access matrix corresponding to the ciphertext. Otherwise, decryption fails.
III. OUR RESULTS
To build our model we will use the prime order group construction of Lewko and Waters [8] , because of its favourable property of having independent attribute authorities. In order to achieve identity-based revocation we supplement the distributed system with a Central Authority. However it seems to contradict with the original aim of distributing the key generation right, this additional authority would generate only secret keys for global identifiers (GID ∈ Z p ) of users and the attribute key generation remains distributed. Our Central Authority does not possess any information that alone would give advantage during decryption, in contrast to single authority schemes, where the authority is able to decrypt all ciphertexts. Regarding this, we can say that our system remains distributed, in spite of launching a Central Authority.
Approach to the Cloud Storage Scenario: We give a high-level description about a possible application of the algorithms that we proposed in Subsection II-C (for graphical depiction see Figure 1 ). Because of efficiency reasons it is practical to encrypt data using a symmetric cipher, always with fresh random number as key. Access control is achieved by encrypting the symmetric key using CP-ABE and attaching the encrypted key to the ciphertext that is stored by the cloud service provider (CSP). Decryption is possible for users, who can obtain the symmetric key, or with other words those, who possess the necessary attributes and were not revoked. Attribute Authorities are run locally on trusted servers of organisations, that are using the system, while the Central Authority is run by the CSP, which also maintains (archives, publishes) the RL revocation list, based on the revocation requests from authorised parties of the organisations. The ABE encryption always uses the fresh RL and ABE decryption is run with the RL at the encryption time of the ciphertext, which are obtained from the CSP. This approach automatically leads to lazy re-encryption of ciphertext, as fresh symmetric key and RL are used whenever data is edited. a) Our Technique.: We face with the challenges of identity-based revocation. To realize the targeted features, we use some ideas from public key broadcast encryption systems [7] . A recent 1 work of Cao and Liu [4] points out an inherent drawback of the [7] scheme, namely that for malicious users it is worth to exchange their decryption keys in order to maximize their interests. However we utilize similar techniques as [7] , our system is not vulnerable to this kind of misuse, because unlike in broadcast encryption, where having a non-revoked secret key is the only requirement for decryption, in ABE, users are also required to fulfil requirements related to their attributes. Thus such collusion could have 1 [4] appeared on ePrint some months later than our work. chosen, then Av = λ is the vector of shares of the secret s according to Π. The share (Av) x = λ x belongs to attribute ρ(x). In [1] it is shown that every linear secret sharing-scheme according to the above definition also enjoys the linear reconstruction property, defined as follows. Suppose that Π is an LSSS for the access structure A. Let S ∈ A be any authorized set, and let I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , } be defined as I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, there exist constants {ω i ∈ Z p } i∈I such that, if {λ i } are valid shares of any secret s according to Π, then i∈I ω i λ i = s. Furthermore, it is also shown in [1] that these constants {ω i } can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix A and for unauthorized sets, no such {ω i } constants exist.
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Cloud Service Provider ID secret Key Figure 1 . A possible usage of the proposed multi-authority CP-ABE scheme for access control in a cloud storage scenario.
only a restricted benefit 2 as the set of ciphertexts that can be decrypted is also restricted by the used attribute secret keys (which cannot be mixed between different users). 3 We use secret sharing in the exponent. Suppose an encryption algorithm needs to create an encryption with a revocation set RL = GID * This approach presents the following challenges. First, we need to make crucial that the decryptor needs to do the GID comparisons even if his attributes satisfy the access structure of the ciphertext. Second we need to make sure that a user with revoked identity GID * k cannot do anything useful with share k. Third, we need to worry about collusion attacks between multiple revoked users.
To address the first one we are going to take advantage of the technique of [8] that is used to prevent collusion attacks. Here the secret s, used for the encryption, is divided into shares, which are further blinded with shares of zero. This structure allows for the decryption algorithm to both reconstruct the main secret and to "unblind" it in parallel. If a user with a particular identifier GID satisfies the access structure, he can reconstruct s in the exponent by raising the group elements to the proper exponents. This operation will simultaneously reconstruct the share of 0 and thus the e (H(GID), g ) blinding terms will cancel out. When we would like to make this algorithm necessary, but not enough for decryption it is straightforward to spoil the "unblinding" of the secret by changing the shares of zero in the exponent to shares of an other random number, s * ∈ Z p . Thus we can require an other computation, namely the comparison of the decryptor's and the revoked users' GIDs. If correspondence is found, the algorithm stops, otherwise reveals the blinding, enabling decryption.
The second challenge is addressed by the following method. A user with GID = GID * k can obtain two linearly independent equations (in the exponent) involving the share s k , which he will use to solve for the share s k . However, if GID = GID * k , the obtained equations are going to be linearly dependent and the user will not be able to solve the system.
In the third case, the attack we need to worry about is where a user with GID * k processes ciphertext share l, while another user with GID * l processes share k, and then they combine their results. To prevent collusion, we use H(GID) as the base of the identity secret key, such that in decryption each user recovers shares s k ·log g H(GID) in the exponent, disallowing the combination of shares from different users.
A. Our Construction
To make the following notions more understandable, in Table I we summarize the new keys and variables (compared to [8] ) which we introduce in our construction. Based on the 
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To address the first one we are going to take advantage of the technique of [8] that is used to prevent collusion attacks. Here the secret s, used for the encryption, is divided into shares, which are further blinded with shares of zero. This structure allows for the decryption algorithm to both reconstruct the main secret and to "unblind" it in parallel. If a user with a particular identifier GID satisfies the access structure, he can reconstruct s in the exponent by raising the group elements to the proper exponents. This operation will simultaneously reconstruct the share of 0 and thus the e(H(GID), g) blinding terms will cancel out. When we would like to make this algorithm necessary, but not enough for decryption it is straightforward to spoil the "unblinding" of the secret by changing the shares of zero in the exponent to shares of an other random number, s * ∈ Z p . Thus we can require an other computation, namely the comparison of the decryptor's and the revoked users' GIDs. If correspondence is found, the algorithm stops, otherwise reveals the blinding, enabling decryption.
To make the following notions more understandable, in Table I we summarize the new keys and variables (compared to [8] ) which we introduce in our construction. Based on the Figure 1 . A possible usage of the proposed multi-authority CP-ABE scheme for access control in a cloud storage scenario.
To make the following notions more understandable, in Table I we summarize the new keys and variables (compared to [8] ) which we introduce in our construction. Based on the decryptor's and the revoked users' GIDs. If correspondence is found, the algorithm stops, otherwise reveals the blinding, enabling decryption. The second challenge is addressed by the following method. A user with GID = GID * k can obtain two linearly independent equations (in the exponent) involving the share s k , which he will use to solve for the share s k . However, if GID = GID * k , the obtained equations are going to be linearly dependent and the user will not be able to solve the system.
To make the following notions more understandable, in Table I we summarize the new keys and variables (compared to [8] ) which we introduce in our construction. Based on the only a restricted benefit 2 as the set of ciphertexts that can be decrypted is also restricted by the used attribute secret keys (which cannot be mixed between different users). 3 We use secret sharing in the exponent. Suppose an encryption algorithm needs to create an encryption with a revocation set RL = GID * This approach presents the following challenges. First, we need to make crucial that the decryptor needs to do the GID comparisons even if his attributes satisfy the access structure of the ciphertext. Second we need to make sure that a user with revoked identity GID * k cannot do anything useful with share k. Third, we need to worry about collusion attacks between multiple revoked users.
To make the following notions more understandable, in Table I we summarize the new keys and variables (compared to [8] ) which we introduce in our construction. Based on the above principles, the proposed algorithms are the following: Global Setup(λ) → GP In the global setup, a bilinear group G 0 of prime order p is chosen. The global public parameters, GP , are p and a generator g of G 0 , and a function H mapping global identities GID ∈ Z p to elements of G 0 (this is modelled as a random oracle in the security proof). Upon the request of a user it first checks whether the user is on the list of revoked users (RL) or it has been queried before, if yes refuses the request, otherwise computes H(GID) and generates the global identity secret key:
Authority Setup(GP ) → (P K, SK) For each attribute i belonging to the authority (these indices i are not reused between authorities), the authority chooses two random exponents α i , y i ∈ Z p and publishes P K = {e(g, g) αi , g yi ∀i} as its public key. It keeps SK = {α i , y i ∀i} as its secret key.
KeyGen(GP, SK, GID, i) → K i,GID
To create a key for a GID, for attribute i belonging to an authority, the authority computes:
Encrypt(GP, M, (A, ρ), {P K}, P K * , RL) → CT The encryption algorithm takes in a message M, an n × access matrix A with ρ mapping its rows to attributes, the global parameters, the public keys of the relevant authorities, the user identity public key and the most recent list of revoked users. It chooses random s, s * ∈ Z p and a random vector v ∈ Z p with s as its first entry. Let λ x denote A x · v, where A x is row x of A. It also chooses a random vector w ∈ Z p with s * as its first entry. Let ω x denote A x · w. Remark 1. We note that an almost equivalent result can be achieved, with some different modifications on the decentralized scheme (splitting C 1,x into two parts, using e(g, g) βs for encryption, where β is the secret of the CA, and publishing g s ) and fitting these to the method of [10] . However in this way additional modifications are still needed to prevent the CA from being able to decrypt any ciphertext by computing e(g β , g s ). Remark 2. Supposing that we have a honest but curious CSP, which does not collude with the users, it is also possible to achieve indirect revocation (similarly to [11] , [15] ), with simple modifications on our scheme. With other words, the CSP could fully supervise user revocation based on the revocation requests from parties, authorised for this. We only need to modify the Encrypt algorithm to compute C, C 0 , C 1,x , C 2,x as originally and C 3,x = g y ρ(x) rx ∀x = 1, . . . , n. These values would form CT that is sent to the CSP, where the collusion resistant CT with the revocation information is computed and published. CT has the same form as earlier, the only difference is that the blinding vector w is chosen by the CSP, so ω x , C * 1,k , C * 2,k (as previously) and C 3,x = C 3,x · g ωx are computed also by the CSP. The main advantage of this approach is that immediate and efficient (partial) re-encryption can be achieved as only w, s k , ω x , C * 1,k , C * 2,k and C 3,x need to be recomputed after a revocation event. Remark 3. Alternatively, it is also possible to give revocation right directly to the encryptor by simply publishing a user list instead of RL. In this case RL would be defined by the user, separately for each ciphertext, and attached to CT .
B. Efficiency
Traditional, attribute-based user revocation (e.g. [14] , [18] , [20] ) affects attributes, thus the revocation of a user may cause the update of all the users' attribute secret keys who had common attribute with the revoked user (a general attribute can affect big proportion of the users) and the re-encryption of all ciphertext the access structure of which contain any of the revoked user's attributes (most of these could not be decrypted by the revoked user).
In our scheme, a revocation event does not have any effect on the attributes as it is based on identity. Although it is a trade-off and in the other hand there is some computational
